


Bruno Augenstein



C-II NOTES QUESTIONS

doctors:

Ray Chire

Harris 7923 +

✓ Chet Cooper (now ~~working~~ aging 6345
rep at White House) (deputy to Kent)
CNC

- ✓ Ed Allen: head of recon work at ORR 7605
(friend of Andy + Joe)

✓ Ed Proctor: change of military branch (?) 7111

✓ Col. John Reid (works for Harris)

✓ ^{Howie} ~~Stoltz~~ Stoltz (used to work for Cooper) 5703

- John Whitman Genthoff

- (J.V. Hitchcock:

DIA: George Fiske OX-76120 or 5200?
(Bob)

Col. Marshall Graham (formerly AFIC)

Eileen McMahon

Col. George Regan? (indications).

ACDA: Ed Rigley

Pete Scoville

IDA/WSEG: Col. ^{USAF} (nt) David Crist (change of AF Indiv. Room).

Pettibone (works for Sub Army in Budget Bureau).

Brown Smith

Komer

Bisell

Sonnenfeldt

Hilman

Newbent

Baray

Hughes

Kalder: Saw (damage assessment on Korean Embassy)

(Mr Brown: change of XX at State)

↳ Question on Cuba:

- 1) Why did K think JFK could let him get away with it?
- 2) Why didn't K prevent US recon, with SAMs + protests?
- 3) Why did his attempt at fait accompli fail?
How could he have improved chances; & how good could they have been?
- 4) Since he was gambling throughout on JFK's will — what convinced him to pull out suddenly?

[What do Suro get from their recon?]

See NIE 10-2-64

Questions for Hitchcock:

1) Emphasis on photos; tendency to discredit early reports.
"Noise"

(Natural; agents' reports contradict each other - can be "used" interestingly.

2) Effect of restrictions on dissem; PSALM; role of
publication in int. comm.

3) Purpose of restrictions. Election theme.

Possibility of survey.

4) Tercit comm; SU alerts; CIA-NSA split.

5) Access of C/I people to "private" comm
of restrictions ----

Knowledge of "signals sent by US"

Puzzles

Not just: Why did he put missiles in Cuba, but

Why do it the way he did? Pattern of secrecy & deception

Why no concealment from U-2 — but concealment from public?

Why misleading statements — & silences — to Pres, when

U-2 was flying?

Why no plan or use of ~~out~~ to SAMs to detect, prevent

recon? (What if...?) To delay intro. of MRBMs?

Why ignore

Pres knowledge of MRBMs not critical to success — why not?

(Oversight? Ignorance of U-2? Lack of knowledge of pressures on Pres to move?)

Look closely at messages to JFK — what they hoped? would reduce risks.

met
27 May, Davies

C-II ~~1904~~
NOTES

Questions

Sows probably didn't know all flights; had only partial tracks; sites didn't always pass on info (i.e. discarded data). Did not cover P in 60 but K probably didn't know, for sure.

(K probably did feel we couldn't be sure what he had)

In Cuba: did people who were picking up plane (Antares) pass on info to P1 people? Was there analysis of what recon saw? Probably not? [They may have noticed planes were avoiding SAMs? Had they seen this pattern elsewhere, earlier? Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia?]

[Could Sows have shot U-2 earlier than they did, in 1958-59?]

D: We don't study question, How much do Sows know about a certain matter? What do they believe?

e.g. Suppose K understands US in SU wage in:

1) Secrecy. O: Russians in conversation take attitude that we can keep secrets very well when we want to: that it is a matter of our choice. (See: 0-2; K; 4-11; II-28; atomic bomb). K probably does not imagine Admin fear of leaks [Kostov: Talmusky said US good at keeping secrets.]

(Well, could VFK have kept missiles/photos a secret or not? Drones, now?)

(Were people who "assumed" leaks in position to judge? What experience was this based on?)

[Was Admin tempted? If not, why not? What different circumstances might have made that option—delaying revelation—more tempting?]

[How much time did they think they had to hold secret? Or, was fear of Cuban firing, or operational status predominant? (Koyan? McN? Park?)

[When decision to hit immediately needed, what factors could have disposed group to draw back to political route? Might blockade have been less strong than it was? How sensitive was our performance & outcome to the way we did it?

What was aim/expectations of blockade? Why does ExComm focus on this

[Was initial group told, the ^{54?} ~~12~~ group? How did it differ?

12 group: R, McG, McN, Kilpatrick, (sometimes Rife?) (Johnson?)
Dandale, RFR?, McG

CRISIS NOTES

QUESTIONS

Questions / comments for Clinic: 20 July 1964

1) NSAM 181 China role; NSC, McG

2) What decided Sept 4 statement

Authorization for rescripts

Sept 13 statements

Why not tell USIB?

3) Why was McC not more influential on Pres? estimates?

4) Effect of incidents on Sept 10 decisions?

5) Influence of Law statements on views of: estimators

policy-makers

6) Purpose of Law statements?

7) Why GREEN

7) Limitation of intell. process in retrospect; Missile Gap.

8) McC's views in retrospect.

9) Purpose + effect of restrictions on dissem.

10) Pres. expectations as of 9 Oct? Did he have reports earlier?

11) First reactions of everyone. Where was Pres?

12) Intent w.r.t. I1-28? How long could strategy have been prepared?
on missile

10. Why did K think he could get away with it?

How could he have improved his chances?

Why did he get out?

What if we had hit missiles: first?
later?

11. Why failure to assess Saw calculations?

12. RFR talks to Dalrymple?

I want: a) McC files on Cuba

b) Secret testimony to Congress

c) Other post-mortems, ^{Bissell} ~~valued~~ studies — like Lidmann

d) spec: U-2, ^{Bissell} Sure, Bay of Pigs, Hungary

e) testimony on U-2, Bay of Pigs

f) Strayer Report. on Sept 19 est.

g) OC/ studies.

Issues: 1) Role of estimates in policy process; influence on Pres.

2) Studies of "surprise" (e.g. Nixon Gap)

3) Internal/external consequences of survey + deception.

4) Analysis of evidence in intell. estimates

(Turkey; Birnbaum; Raiffa; Barnard)

(Modarres; Edwards)

5) Evaluation of specific types of evidence, for Pres:

e.g. Saw statements

Cline:

a) restrictions on dissem.

b) Sept 4 statement

[Did Admin. disbelieve that Soviets would ignore
our warning (like the one here); & ignore our
commitment; & political problems; & deceive us; &
not answer our questions? Did all these lower
the prior prob. ~~with~~ of hyp of missiles, in face of
evidence; hence, slow recon process, evaluation of reports?
slow lowering of security barriers to permit planning?]

Note: all this would look unjustifiable to public]

[What is graph over time of JFK, ^{McGeorge Bundy} Mc G, etc. prob
of SU missiles then or later? What influenced it?
What kept it from being influenced otherwise? How
correlated with actions, statements?]

[Were Sov statements meant to commit Berlin & Cuba,
when we noticed?]

[How did JFK, etc. view motives of SU after 14 Oct:
deployment, style, description? How angry were they?]